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The French health care system embraced New Public Management (NPM) selectively, and crafted their own version
of NPM using Diagnostic-Related-Group accounting to re-centralize the health care system. Other organizational
changes include the adoption of quasi-markets, public private partnerships, and pay-for-performance schemes for
General Practitioners. There is little evidence that these improved the performance of the system. Misrepresentation
has remained high. With the 2009 Hospital, Patients, Health and Territories Act physician participation in hospital
governance receded. Decision-making powers and health units were re-concentrated to instill greater national
coherence into the health system.
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The path toward new public management
European economic integration with policies dictating that
the achievement of supranational objectives prevails over
national and regional policies, the adoption of a monetary
convergence criteria (to illustrate the point, national
budget deficits are capped at 3%), and the perception that
Keynesianism failed in the 1980s, all prompted French
public policy makers to adopt a new market-based para-
digm to drive economic policy [1]. Under the impetus of
top-politicians, consulting firms (the transfer of corporate
management recipes to the public sector provided them
with a steady source of income) [2], and liberal think-
tanks [3,4], a new generation of civil servants from the
French National School of Public Administration and the
“Grandes ecoles” (i.e., the French equivalent of US Ivy
League universities) – a “programmatic elite” [5] – who,
like the public, wanted a delivering government [4], em-
braced New Public Management (NPM) [6] in a bid to im-
prove public services delivery. Private hospitals and
hospital bureaucrats who view these reforms as legal (they
were voted in Parliament) and rational because they re-
spond to a need for a more efficient allocation of re-
sources, also supported the NPM. In contrast, the
operating core (the medical profession) usually resisted
NPM reforms, albeit with mixed success due to the risingCorrespondence: dsimonet@aus.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ordivision of physician trade unions [7]. Local notables, such
as mayors and their constituency, who oppose the closure
of smaller hospitals in rural areas, also questioned this
neo-liberal progressivism. As an instrumental value, ‘effi-
ciency’ may serve competing interests and mean different
things to different groups. From the government per-
spective, efficiency implies budget discipline and an em-
phasis on lower costs. For private operators, it implies
market share expansion. For patients, it means shorter
waiting times. That ambiguity allowed NPM to perme-
ate the health system in a politically correct manner.
EU integration was also a factor. Budget deficits, tax-
ation levels, and the share of health expenditures in the
GDP – rather than quality indicators such as life expect-
ancy and infant mortality – became essential tools in com-
paring country achievements. Key NPM concepts, such as
the use of market forces to serve public purposes [8],
activity-based payments, management by objectives,
quasi-contracts (as in the British NHS [9]), and outsour-
cing, made their way into French national policy [10]. Em-
phasis was placed on benchmarking [11] and performance
evaluation [12,13]. Programs were broken down into mis-
sions subjected to performance indicators or “public man-
agement by numbers” [14].
Scott et al. [15] see healthcare as a rapidly changing
environment with defined timeframes; the era of profes-
sional dominance (1945–1965) with an emphasis on
quality; the era of federal involvement with a focus ontd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
Simonet, D Health Research Policy and Systems 2014, 12:57 Page 2 of 9
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/12/1/57greater access via Medicare and Medicare program
(1966–1982); and a managerial era with a reliance on mar-
ket mechanisms and entrepreneurship. Likewise, France
emphasized the NPM entrepreneurial hospital model over
the ‘traditional’ compassionate (e.g., care provision to the
destitute and the vulnerable) and professional (e.g., phys-
ician training) hospital models [16,17].
Assessment of overseas NPM experiments
Earlier assessments of NPM, notably in Commonwealth
nations, point to outcomes below expectations. “The
commoditization of deregulated health systems makes
them very inefficient and very expensive and it exacer-
bates inequalities and leads to a deterioration of the
quality of care”, the World Health Organization (WHO)
concluded in its 2008 report on health. Though the way
in which the “NHS operates was changed irrevocably by
the quasi-market reforms”, there were relatively “little
measurable changes that could be related unequivocally
to the core mechanisms of the quasi-market” [18]. A cul-
ture of ‘glossification’ or investment designed to impress
rather than to provide better outcomes permeated the
NHS [19]. For some [20-22], competition led to better
results. For others [23-25], competition, specifically price
competition, had no impact on health outcomes. In
Australia (and also Italy), the largest outsourcing con-
tract in public health of the 1990s was unsuccessful
[26,27] since major contractors failed to deliver [28,29].
A merry-go-round of outsourcing and reintegration
followed the outcry of the medical profession and the
media. Market orientation had a negligible effect on per-
formance judgment of local managers or the Audit
Commission [30]. New Zealand, an NPM index case,
abandoned its quasi-market structure [31] after it failed
to tackle cross-government problems, notably in the
areas of health and pediatric wellbeing [32], and has
moved toward national coordination and centralization
of some planning and service delivery functions [33]. In
Australia, there “appears to be no particular benefit to
service users of quasi-market reforms, particularly in pol-
icy contexts where service delivery systems are historically
under-funded” [34]. Moreover, market transaction costs
probably surpass potential savings that quasi-markets
may generate. In other non-Commonwealth nations,
such as Italy, the government of Lombardy “deliberately
sacrificed competition in order to control health expendi-
tures” [35]. A comprehensive review of European Public-
Private Partnerships revealed mixed results [36].
Other ‘traditional’ NPM tools [37], such as general
practitioner (GP) pay-for-performance schemes, too
had a limited impact [38] or no impact at all [39] in for-
eign exemplars. The US [40,41] and UK governments
struggled to pay for performance or better outcomes.
Vogel [42] suggests that “the often assumed superiorityof managerial over bureaucratic control is constructed
through discourse rather than being a law-like regularity”.
Emphasis on performance evaluation appears time-
consuming, confusing (e.g., the use of management instru-
ments to improve the performance of public services does
not always simplify the public management exercise) [43],
and expensive [44]. Moreover, it neither prevented poor
quality of some care providers [45], nor led to a more effi-
cient or accountable management at the local level [45].
In foreign exemplars [46,47], audits, constant monitoring,
and performance measurement have spillover-effects such
as ambiguous responsibility and increased complexity. As
accountability is increasingly shared and thus dispersed
among multiple stakeholders, clarity is lacking [48] and its
relationship with performance is increasingly contested
[49]. Often, evaluation reflects differing perceptions of in-
surance and performance rather than actual performance
improvement [50]; hence, there is a need to refine ac-
countability for a greater public good [51]. This, however, is
harder to achieve in health care than in other public areas
due to cultural differences between physicians, administra-
tors, and politicians. The intersection of professional cul-
ture, rules, and patient needs creates instances of both rule
abidance and deviation, all of which affect quality [52];
therefore, the performance-enhancing (or -obstructing) ef-
fects of targets and rankings will vary according to the cul-
ture in which they operate and the level of unorthodoxy it
tolerates [14].
During the 1990s, decentralization of decisions from the
central government (the Ministry of Health) to regions and
locally-elected officials was seen as a way to open govern-
ance to a wider participation of the public and civil society
[53]. In France, for instance, the city mayor was the chair-
man of the hospital supervisory board. Decentralization,
however, was not necessarily more democratic [54] and
proved expensive, as seen by an increase of 124% and 64%
of the debts of regions and counties (or Departement) in a
decade.a Moreover, it led to rising discrepancies in acces-
sing care [55] and regional policies’ efficacy was question-
able [56].
French selective adoption of NPM
Health systems and their policies are complex social phe-
nomena that are not only shaped by human action, rather
than naturally occurring [57], but are also constrained by
historical, social, and institutional arrangements. Far from
constituting a single uniform paradigm, NPM is a doctrinal
makeshift or ‘doctrinal puzzle’ [58] that is also influenced
by national characteristics such as centralization in France.
Decentralization is a relatively recent phenomenon that
dates back to the 1980s and contrast with its Napoleonic
tradition of centralization [56].
We undertook a review of current studies to evaluate
NPM impact on the French Health Care system. The
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of authority to reinforce the central government’s role in
the definition of a national health policy. In the mid-
1990s, a ‘wave’ of agencification occurred in the areas of
public health. The Juppé reforms (1996) created the
Regional Hospital Agencies (RHAs) that took over some,
but not all, responsibilities from the Ministry of Health,
such as the County Bureau of Social and Sanitary Affairs
or Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et
Sociales to determine health priorities with the input of
the Regional Health Conferences and the Regional Com-
mittees on Health or Comite Regionaux d’Organisation
de Santé. RHAs introduced novel management practices
[57] such as multi-years performance contracts with care
providers. On top of that were the National Accredit-
ation and Evaluation Agency and a High Authority on
Health. In recent years, however, France rejected the deci-
sion on decentralization of health care and, more gener-
ally, the NPM-endorsed disaggregation of health agencies
that were traditionally advocated in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries [58-60]. The 2009 Hospital, Patients, Health, and
Territories (HPST) Act enforced a re-concentration of all
health responsibilities – not just the hospital prerogatives
of the earlier RHA – into a Regional Health Agency.
Moreover, the smaller regulatory and service delivery
agencies (the Regional Public Health Groups or Groupe-
ments Régionaux de Santé Publique, the Regional Health
committees or Missions Régionales de Santé, and the Re-
gional Sickness Funds) were regrouped into the Regional
Health Agencies. France adopted contractual agreements
for its care providers and focused on outcome-oriented ra-
ther than input-based budgets. However, despite reiterated
calls for greater accountability and transparency [61]
and a movement towards an ‘audit society’ [62], misrep-
resentation has remained high [63]. Finally, French
NPM reforms restricted democratic planning and led to
a re-concentration of health organizations to achieve
greater national coherence.
Diagnostic related groups (DRGs) and the quest for
central government control
Originally derived from the 30-year-old Program of
Medicalization of Information Systems or Programme de
Médicalisation des Systèmes d’Information, activity-based
payment or Tarification a l’Activité is the French version
of the US Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRG) (i.e., a group
of patients with medically-related and economically-
comparable diagnosis), as defined by Fetter [64]. Unlike
the former fixed global budget based on regional demo-
graphics, such as population size and age covering all hos-
pital expenditures, DRGs, referred to as Homogenous
Groups of Patients (‘Groupes Homogenes de Malades’) in
France are pre-determined reimbursement rates that re-
flect services that are actually delivered. DRGs are a goodproxy for the broader concept of NPM, because DRGs
draw on two of its basic principles: firstly, a split between fi-
nancing, primarily from the government, and care provision
by hospitals; secondly, incentivisation and competition for
patients [60,65], as care providers’ income is directly related
to patient volume [66]. This uniform DRG rate schedule
for all hospitals nationwide replaced the former hospital fi-
nancing model that depended on patient length of stay,
local demographic factors such as population size, and the
hospital bargaining power during fee negotiation with the
central government. With care providers’ funding currently
depending almost solely on DRGs (their penetration rate
increased from 10% in 2004 to 100% in 2011 for French
public hospitals, the highest in Europe) [67] and other
supplementary payments, for instance for research and
training, hospitals are rewarded, or punished, for their
economizing behavior. Poorly-performing units, such as
hospital wards with higher costs or fewer patients, must
return to profitability or close, as observed among other
public organizations that embraced similar competitive
payment mechanisms [68]. The French Social Security
offers incentives to care providers such as a repayment
of a fraction of the savings achieved, which can be used
to acquire new equipment or to improve staff working
conditions.
Due to the NPM’s greater focus on accounting and bud-
geting issues, the geographic, economic and administrative
(i.e., the re-centralization or the need to ‘reassert the cen-
ter’) agenda of DRGs was largely ignored. These, however,
had the potential to prevent regional disparities, a long-
standing characteristic of the French health care system
[69,70]. The rise of the regional authority in the 1990s [71]
caused ‘inefficiencies’ such as a ‘Balkanization’ of the health
system, as exemplified by rising health disparities across re-
gions [72], which is the burgeoning of local health organiza-
tions (regional health forums and conferences) with each
having their very own policy agenda that sometimes contra-
dict the national health plan that DRGs intend to remedy.
Hospitals were traditionally run by municipalities; often,
the city mayor doubled up as the director at the hospital
board. From an administrative perspective, DRGs prompt
hospitals to achieve centrally, rather than regionally-
defined, cost targets, which, in theory, will restore the au-
thority of the central government over regions [4].
From an economic perspective, DRGs would adjust hos-
pital resources to actual clinical activity, thus preventing the
inflationary effect of the former global budgeting and per
diem payments. Moreover, these mechanisms were poorly
regulated, complex, and unfair since budget depended on
historic trends [73] but also on the provider’s ability to ne-
gotiate with the Social Security [74]. By gathering data on
hospital costs across the country, thereby enabling a com-
parison of their ‘productivity’, DRGs would induce a nation-
wide standardization of care provision (DRG payments are
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theory, align medical practice with that of the most efficient
providers, as in the NPM neo-Taylorist model [17].
From a political perspective, however, this re-
integration questions the NPM-driven neo-liberal
agenda. Centralization is a general thrust in the French
political system that intends to restore the power of
top-level bureaucrats who lost their prerogatives dur-
ing the decentralization era of the 1980s and 1990s.
The center (i.e., the Ministry of Health) developed the
DRG scale as a tool to unify payments across regions
so that hospital compensation no longer depends on
past historic trends and on the bargaining power of
local notables. Its intent was to de-politicize the man-
agement of regions [75] and to restore a fiscal discip-
line that was lacking among local politicians.
The rise of quasi-markets, GP pay-for-performance
schemes, and public-private partnerships
As in British quasi-markets (markets are ‘quasi’ rather
than ‘pure’ since players are not necessarily competing
for a profit, nor are they necessarily private, some are
state-owned) [10], the French state is no longer a care
provider (the term ‘public hospital’ has disappeared from
the official government nomenclature in the aftermath
of the 2009 HPST Act), but a financier of health services
[76] that stewards or ‘steers’ the production of health ser-
vices rather than produce or ‘row’ these services directly
[77]. Contract-based management or Contrats d'Objectifs
et de Moyens between Regional Health Agencies (Agence
Regional de Santé) and hospitals lays the foundation of
these quasi-markets, defining financing grants and activity
targets for care providers, including patient volume, as in
the NPM-endorsed corporate Management by Objective
and Results approach [78]. France, however, did not go as
far as the UK when it comes to quasi-market implementa-
tion because of stronger counter powers such as the oper-
ating core, e.g., the medical profession. In theory, hospitals
and out-of-hospital care providers, public or private [79],
compete for Social Security funding under the supervision
of the Regional Health Agencies. In practice, however,
activity-based payments are not determined by the market;
hospitals are not permitted to set fees for their services –
these are decided and administered by the central govern-
ment based on a sample of participating hospitals [80].
Since prices are regulated, one can talk about fictitious
competition [81]. Moreover, hospitals receive supplemen-
tary payments other than DRGs to fulfill some of their
public service missions, including physician residency pro-
grams that public, rather than private, hospitals provide
[82], or to pay for experimental treatment, with both pay-
ment types providing opportunities for cost-shifting.
Moreover, prices alone are not enough to drive policy im-
plementation, as care providers and patients do notspontaneously behave as price takers; hence, a GP pay-for-
performance scheme or Contract for Improving Individual
Practice (Contrats d’Amélioration des Pratiques Indivi-
duelles) rewards solo physicians with premiums of up to
€5,000 for providing preventive services and for efficient
prescribing in the treatment of chronic diseases. Three
months after its introduction in 2009, more than 10% of
GPs joined the scheme [83]. The 2007 and the 2012
National Hospital Plans recommended Public-Private
Partnerships (PPP) to delegate certain services that are too
expensive for a single public operator such as the con-
struction and maintenance of hospitals. The private oper-
ator collects a lease over 30 years; the hospital will be
handed over to the public sector after that period. PPPs
have been rising fast (77 were adopted in 2011, 36 in
2010) under the Sarkozy presidency, with France pouring
more money into PPPs (€3.5 billion in 2008 according to
Constitutional Council) than the UK (€3.11 billion accord-
ing to the UK Treasury, 2011), an NPM index-case. PPPs
in health care accounted for a €6 billion investment in
2011 out of €90 billion in total public investment [84].
However, that number has experienced a steady decline
with only 36 PPP from January till October 2012 and 17
from January till October 2013.b
A critical assessment
Evaluation of French NPM reforms on health services’
efficiency point to outcomes below expectations. Despite
a long tradition of cost/benefit analysis among French
bureaucrats [85] via the adoption of a rational model of
public budgeting in 1970 (i.e., ‘Rationalization des Choix
Budgetaires’), assessments based on simple health indi-
cators, such as mortality rates and other measurable
health outcomes, including hospital readmission rates,
length of stay, or quality of care, are not routinely avail-
able in France [86]. Therefore, from a medical perspec-
tive (changes in the quality of care, improved health
outcomes), the impact of NPM is difficult to ascertain. In-
stead of improving or simplifying government execution,
it appears that constant monitoring created additional
risks [87] and costs [88] that remain largely un-quantified,
such as accounting (French hospitals hire ‘DRG-coders’
when they should hire physicians) and social costs. Mois-
don and Tonneau [80] observe that “adopting tariff is to
accept an implicit planning that benefits the most efficient
care providers, leads to a supplier concentration and a
withdrawal from certain areas”. The medically under-
served areas (rural areas suffers from a longstanding short-
age of GPs) fare worse under NPM, as more public
hospitals close in geographic areas that do not support a
sufficient patient pool [89]. On top of this adds the closure
of medical services that are too expensive to run such as
cardiology, nephrology and emergency services in city-
centers [16]. Discrepancies in hospital payments, the
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peared, but were merely shifted from the central govern-
ment to the patient who carries a higher share of the cost.
Despite a nationwide uniform DRG scale, daily fees, which
are set by the hospital director, approved by the RHA, and
paid for by the patient and his/her supplementary insur-
ance, varies significantly. In a survey on medical cost in
city-based hospitals, procedure costs ranged from €360
euros to €2,230 for a similar medical condition with an
average cost of €817. Therefore, fees still do not reflect
care intensity, but constitute an adjustment mechanism to
balance the hospital budget [90].
The public/private sector gap is rising. Private hospi-
tals focus on the most profitable DRGs (including ambu-
latory care, elective surgery, and maternity care) [73],
leaving services with poor returns, for instance, organ
transplantation or emergency services, which are more ex-
pensive to run, or welfare services (often, emergency rooms
double up as shelters for the homeless), to the public sector.
Compounding factors are patient selection, which were de-
scribed early on in foreign exemplars [91,92]. Therefore,
one cannot yet talk about ‘hybridization’ or the concomi-
tant development of professionalization [93] and the
streamlining of the public sector for a balanced budget.
The level of debt of public hospitals even trebled between
2003 and 2011 [94]. Thus, regarding the frugal use of public
funds, as endorsed by NPM, outcomes are wanting.
As for PPPs, particularly for the construction of hospi-
tals, outcomes are clearly negative for the tax payer. Early
PPP evaluations point to inadequacies. According to the
regional General Accounting Office [95] that reviewed the
largest hospital construction site in the city of Evry, a
simulation for a 30 year public loan of €344 million cost a
total of €757 million compared to the €1.2 billion that
were actually paid to the private operator Eiffage. Unlike a
private operator that contracts loans at higher rates or in-
vests its own funds with an expected return on investment
of 10% to 15%, public operators benefit from lower finan-
cing costs since they can borrow at preferential rates.
These failures prompted the French government to adopt
more stringent regulations to ensure that PPPs do not
bankrupt municipalities. According to Decree No. 2012–
1093, voted on September, 27, 2012, municipalities must
evaluate the impact of every prospective PPP on their fi-
nances and credit rating before approving it. With munici-
palities being unable to manage their budget and mayors
embarking on expensive investment with intergenerational
implications, the government had to set up a fund (2014 Fi-
nance Orientation Law) with a yearly appropriation of €100
million for the next 15 years to bail out local governments
that were unable to repay the debts that PPP incurred.
Current PPPs in Caen, Annemasse, and Saint Nazaire will
help determine whether PPPs are economically-viable strat-
egies, but with the arrival of a new Prime Minister ManuelValls who is known to be hostile to these arrangements,
PPPs are likely to be delayed further.
Can NPM prevent misrepresentation?
The impact of NPM on fraud and abuse is not a main-
stream issue in the NPM debate. On the one hand, it is
argued that competition rather than cooperation, greater
transparency, and physician liability, via output budget-
ing, can help prevent fraud, or at least detect it [96]. On
the other, George Frederickson asserts that “in demo-
cratic settings, government agencies and their officials in
bureaucratic hierarchies are more ethical than self-
interested individuals or firms in competitive markets”
([97], p. 300). According to Grunow [98], the quest for
efficiency, a flatter hierarchy which reduces the scope
and intensity of control, and the decentralization of the
decision-making process that entrusts more people with
power over funding, have undermined other equally im-
portant public values such as integrity and public interest.
Grunow [98] observed a steep increase of up to 700% of
corruption cases in the German public administration that
coincides with the introduction of NPM in the mid-1990s.
In theory, DRGs enhance transparency and accountability;
in practice, however, their inherent characteristics make
them prone to ‘gaming’ the system. Physicians can adopt
new opportunistic behaviors by manipulating DRGs, for
instance, by ‘up-coding’ diseases. DRG codes with higher
compensation rates can be attributed to the same disease
(also known as DRG ‘creep’). Hospitals reduce that risk by
hiring DRG-coders which increase costs and therefore
contradicts the NPM cost-cutting agenda. Because of that
‘decoupling’ [99] or “disconnects between formal structures
and what individuals actually do in the course of ac-
tion…”, ethics and integrity may not necessarily be higher.
France has the second highest estimated insurance and
health care fraud losses (i.e., €10.576 billion) among 27 EU
nations [63]. Exposure of fund mismanagement did not
enhance accountability, and though it has not yet demobi-
lized and bred resignation, public indignation remains low
[100]. French citizens are less concerned with health care
fraud than they are with others types of fraud such as cor-
porate and bank fraud, they are more preoccupied by
other competing issues such as unemployment [101], and
remain divided over other societal issues such as immigra-
tion and same sex marriage [102]. Therefore, the govern-
ment has little incentive to tackle the fraud issue more
effectively.
The democratic recess
Centralized – rather than regional – government interven-
tion has been rising under NPM. Top-down decision-
making by the Ministry of Health, regarding personnel
appointment and the definition of a DRG scale by the
Ministry of Health for all hospitals across the country,
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icy making [53]. Under the 2009 HPST Act, the Ministry of
Health appoints hospital managers (they used to be elected
by their peers rather than appointed) and regional health
agency managers. These can also be hired from the private
sector (being a civil servant is no longer a pre-requisite to
manage a health agency), and were given extended power
and incentives (for instance, they can be fired if they do not
meet centrally-defined targets) to achieve their objectives.
By strengthening the power of centrally-appointed hospital
directors and regional health agency managers at the ex-
pense of other traditional stakeholders, including city
mayors, health care professionals, and trade-unions (to il-
lustrate, public hospitals are often the largest employers in
smaller cities) [103], the 2009 HPST Act intended to bring
coherence to the national health system and reduce con-
flicts at the hospital strategic apex level. Sarkozy demanded
“a real boss at the hospital” [104].
The hospital governance reform contained in the 2009
HPST Act ended regionalization [57] and the ‘democratic’
strategic planning of hospitals. The hospital board of direc-
tors was replaced by a supervisory board and the executive
board by a managing board, with both having reduced
power (art L. 6141–1 of Public Health Law). Therefore, the
NPM-endorsed transparency is not always associated with
a greater participation of the operating core [105]. Con-
tracts with incentives are expected to yield better results in
a single vertical hierarchical structure with clear power lines
running from the Ministry of Health and its Office of
Hospitalization and Organization of Care (Direction de
l’Hospitalisation et de l’Organisation des Soins) to the hos-
pital via the Regional Health Agency.
Achieving national coherence via re-concentration and
re-centralization of health care decisions
The 2009 HPST Act also merged regional institutions
(for instance, Regional Association of Sickness Funds
or Union Régionale des Caisses d’Assurance Maladie;
Regional Directorship for Sanitary and Social Affairs
or Direction Régionale des Affaires Sanitaires et
Sociales) into a single ‘one-stop shop’, the Regional
Health Agency, that complies with a nationally-defined
health expenditure target. This re-concentration which
extended to hospitals [106] intend to increase the
capacity to govern that was lacking among early NPM
adopters. Moreover, the widespread adoption of infor-
mation technology [107], such as electronic medical
records and accounting systems in the new digital-era
[108], will ease the collection of health data, reduce
transaction costs [109], eliminate the information
asymmetry that benefits the medical profession [110],
and allow a better planning and monitoring of hospital
activity from a central – rather than regional – level.
Other elements of national coherence were reinforced.There is a definition of a national – rather than re-
gional – expenditures target and decisions concerning
hospital planning and investment are made at the cen-
tral – rather than local – level. Despite the differences
with Anglo-Saxon reforms, such as the whole-of-
government accounts in the UK [111], greater joining-
up [112], and agency coordination in New Zealand
[113] and Australia [114], French administrative re-
forms share the same goals: help rebuild the state [115]
and reassert the center [116,117] that lost some of its
prerogatives to regions and departments due to
decentralization, even if those power gains are at the
expense of patients-citizens. Eventually, that recentral-
ization will not only benefit top political and top civil
servants, but also a business oligarchy of private
clinics, private insurance groups, and consulting firms.
Conclusion: toward a reconfiguration of the French
Welfare State
In theory, NPM reforms will generate efficiencies in the
French health care system. However, these were imple-
mented more for pragmatic aims (the need to instill a
budget discipline, a 3% deficit under EU regulations, an
objective which is shared by both the leftists and the
rightists, and to control regions that have a tendency to
overspend) rather than for ideological reasons (the con-
version to a liberal market economy). Moreover, the
French psyche does not welcome the idea of competition
within the public sector, and health care services are in-
herently public rather than private goods in France
[118]. Instead, ‘fiscal pragmatism’, top civil servants, and
supranational institutions (e.g., EEC, bond rating agen-
cies) demand reforms to balance the budget. These new
policies are intended to redeploy the state interventionist
powers from ownership of care facilities to hospital gov-
ernance and to the definition of a national health policy
at the expense of policy making and implementation at
the local level. The use of DRG accounting and the def-
inition of clear lines of responsibility (a ‘power vertical’ from
the Ministry of Health to the hospital managers and
Regional Health Agencies) are designed to accelerate re-
form execution. They do not indicate a withdrawal of the
state from public affairs. Greater reliance on market-based
mechanisms, reduced state-ownership, and rising private fi-
nancing [119] imply more – not less – government regula-
tions (e.g., regarding the pricing of health services,
establishment of care providers) to manage hospital compe-
tition, as in the Anglo-Saxon model [120]. This theory of
an active regulatory welfare state [5,121], which is “not
based on the extension of the public sphere, but on the re-
duction of the autonomy of non-state actors”, relies on stan-
dards (DRGs, GPs pay-for-performance schemes) and
regulations of new entrants, for instance private operators,
to govern ‘at a distance’ [122,123]. Despite these advances,
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shortage of physicians and expensive equipment, such as
MRI, and the unavailability of emergency services in many
rural areas. With their effectiveness being questioned in
France [16,86,94] and abroad [124], NPM reforms have
stalled (for instance, the objective of leveling up the ‘playing
field’ via a convergence of DRG payments for public and
private hospitals was delayed until 2018) and, with the ar-
rival of president Hollande in May 2012, priorities shifted
to other pressing issues, such as the reintegration of physi-
cians into hospital governance [125], and a focus on quality
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Patients, Health, and Territories Act; NPM: New Public Management;
PPP: Public-Private Partnerships; RHA: Regional Hospital Agencies;
WHO: World Health Organization.
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